Five archetype deployments. Each shows the other tools SafeHarbor cohabits with, how data flows between them, and what SafeHarbor contributes that SIEMs, EDRs, and CSPMs cannot. Vendor names are representative — SafeHarbor integrates with 2,000+ tools across 25 canonical categories, and every architecture can be reproduced with whichever products the customer has already bought.
| Layer | Example vendors | SafeHarbor's role |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint | CrowdStrike Falcon for Government · Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (GCC-H) · Elastic Defend | Consumer of asset + vulnerability telemetry |
| Identity | Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Government) · Okta for U.S. Government · CAC / PIV | Consumer of user, role, and MFA state |
| SIEM | Splunk Enterprise · Microsoft Sentinel (Azure Government) · Elastic Security | Emits audit + enforcement events outbound |
| Ticketing | ServiceNow GRC · Jira Data Center | POA&M items auto-opened / closed |
| Compliance register | eMASS · Xacta | OSCAL 1.1.2 + eMASS CSV export |
| Control plane | SafeHarbor | Asset graph · risk · OSCAL · closed-loop enforcement |
Signed asset-posture facts (patch state, MFA, EDR coverage, classification tag) are published for consumption by any PDP/PEP. No other tool in the stack produces that composite.
eMASS and Xacta both accept OSCAL; SIEMs and EDRs don't produce it. SafeHarbor does, directly from live graph state.
When a control drifts, SafeHarbor's desired-state engine fires a remediation playbook. The enforcement event is itself HMAC-chained for assessor review.
| Layer | Example vendors | SafeHarbor's role |
|---|---|---|
| CSPM / CNAPP | Wiz · Prisma Cloud · Orca | Consumer of cloud misconfigurations |
| EDR | CrowdStrike · Defender | Consumer of endpoint posture |
| Vuln scanner | Tenable SC · Tenable One · Qualys VMDR · Rapid7 | Consumer of CVE findings |
| Identity | Okta · Entra ID | Consumer of user entitlements |
| Compliance tooling | Drata · Vanta | Replaced for regulated assessment; SafeHarbor emits OSCAL natively |
| Control plane | SafeHarbor | Unified graph · risk scoring · OSCAL · audit chain |
SSP + POA&M + SAR generated from the same live data the CSPM sees. Drata and Vanta emit checklists, not OSCAL.
Wiz is cloud-only; CrowdStrike is endpoint-only. Unifying them in Excel is how agencies fail continuous-ATO audits.
Linear regression over Timescale history, exportable to executives as PDF or PPTX.
| Layer | Example vendors | SafeHarbor's role |
|---|---|---|
| XDR | CrowdStrike · SentinelOne · Defender XDR | Primary endpoint telemetry source |
| SIEM | Splunk · Datadog · Elastic | Outbound audit + enforcement stream |
| IdP | Okta · Entra ID | Identity, MFA, and entitlement ingest |
| MDM | Jamf · Intune | Device management state |
| Vuln scanner | Tenable VM · Rapid7 InsightVM | CVE findings |
| Control plane | SafeHarbor | CAASM · attack-path · toxic combos · remediation grouping |
XDRs answer "is this endpoint safe?" SafeHarbor answers "is this business service safe given every asset, user, and relationship it touches?"
23 AD-style edge types modeled from ingested data. No BloodHound collector running on the DC. Paths rank by exploitability and blast radius.
200 findings collapsed into 12 patch groups, ranked by dollar-at-risk × exploit probability — not CVSS alone.
| CTEM stage | Primary tool | SafeHarbor's role |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Scoping | SafeHarbor business services + tag RBAC | Native |
| 2. Discovery | Connectors + DGraph graph | Native |
| 3. Prioritization | Attack paths + toxic combos + $-at-risk | Native |
| 4. Validation | AttackIQ · SafeBreach · Pentera · Horizon3 | Partner + OPFOR analysis-layer emulation |
| 5. Mobilization | POA&M · control plane · ticketing | Native |
| Coverage | 4 of 5 stages natively | BAS partner story for the fifth |
Only Validation requires a partner. Every other CTEM stage ships in the single SafeHarbor binary on day one.
When AttackIQ or Pentera proves a path is exploitable in production, SafeHarbor marks it validated_live and it outranks untested paths.
An assessor can walk a POA&M item from "opened by CTEM run" to "closed by playbook X, validated by BAS rerun Y" with HMAC-signed continuity.
| Layer | Example vendors | SafeHarbor's role |
|---|---|---|
| OT passive monitoring | Claroty CTD · Dragos · Nozomi | Ingest PLC / SCADA inventory |
| IT endpoint | CrowdStrike · Defender | Standard IT ingest |
| Identity | Entra ID · AD | Identity + admin access |
| Firewall / NGFW | Palo Alto · Fortinet | Enforcement edge (rule push) |
| SIEM | Splunk ITSI | Unified alert stream |
| Control plane | SafeHarbor | Unified IT/OT graph · segmentation gaps · 62443 |
Claroty sees the PLCs. CrowdStrike sees the workstations. Neither sees the admin who can pivot Level 5 → Level 2. SafeHarbor does.
Cross-Purdue paths surface as toxic combinations with a direct enforcement hook for the NGFW, not as a ticket for a human to correlate.
OT compliance framework mapping ships alongside NIST 800-53, CMMC, and PCI — not a bolt-on module.
docs/business/reference-architectures.html and .md — canonical briefs tied to each GTM segment, shared with sales, SEs, and partner engineering.
Each section transplants to a /solutions/<segment> website page. SVG diagrams render standalone; vendor matrices are competitor-neutral.
For new verticals (HIPAA, PCI, vertical-specific adversary programs) copy one section, replace the vendor matrix and diagram. The SafeHarbor role row is stable: graph, risk, compliance output, closed-loop enforcement.